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The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000100030029-2  
Washington, D. C. 20505

13 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT : ABM Treaty Review (PRM/NSC-26)

REFERENCE : NSC Memorandum; Subject as above, dated September 2, 1977

1. The issues for decision are primarily policy questions and therefore my comments are confined to intelligence-related aspects, including possible Soviet reactions, which should be taken into account in the decision-making process.

2. It is my judgment that the Soviets would prefer to fine tune the Treaty rather than introduce or consider any major amendments. They have demonstrated during the past two sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) a willingness to clarify Treaty language in three specific areas. While they probably would prefer to limit fine tuning to these three topics, they would not object strenuously to similar discussions, during the review process, of other Treaty provisions.

3. With respect to the banning of all deployed ABM systems [III B-1-C(1)], such an amendment would simplify our monitoring tasks. Without the Moscow battle-management radars, there would be less potential for the Soviets to deploy ABM-capable systems. It is unlikely, however, that the Soviets would agree to such a proposal.

-- While not capable of defending against a concerted US attack, the Moscow system does have the capability to handle unauthorized or accidental launches and, more importantly, small unsophisticated attacks by the Chinese. During SALT ONE, the Soviets strongly argued the need for an ABM defense of their capital against accidental launch.

-- The Soviets have a huge investment in the Moscow system; moreover, it would be enormously expensive to dismantle or destroy it.

-- Since the US is now effectively at zero, there is no quid pro quo.

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4. How the Soviets would react to a proposal to ban development and testing of ABM systems and components [III B-1-C(2)] is unclear. The Soviets probably would not be amenable to such a ban because they lag considerably behind the US in ABM technology; they may expect the US program to remain at a low level of funding and that their continuing R&D efforts will eventually close the gap. Moreover, the Soviets would probably desire to maintain an R&D hedge against the future. We can not exclude, however, the possibility that they would perceive US ABM technology to be sufficiently advanced so that it was preferable to halt the US program, especially if they are not confident of solving the ABM problem. Soviet acceptance of such a ban could make our monitoring job easier.

5. If a further tightening of the ABM Treaty is desired as part of the ABM Treaty review, a more negotiable proposal might be to ban the deployment of ABM systems based on "other physical principles." In conjunction with the ABM Treaty, the US and the USSR have already agreed "that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles... are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion...and agreement." In light of current Soviet initiatives on banning new weapons of mass destruction and the Soviet views expressed during SALT ONE, the Soviets would probably be receptive to such a proposal. They would not likely agree, however, to ban developmental activity. The monitoring problems associated with a deployment ban would be no different than at present.

6. Any of the listed Treaty amendments which would increase permitted ABM defenses [III B-2-C] would have a severe impact on our monitoring capabilities. Each would, in varying degrees, provide a base for territorial or nation-wide defense, if deployed by the Soviets. This is particularly true with respect to the light area defense. There can be no assurance that such a defense could be adequately defined or verified. A monitoring requirement to differentiate between hard site ABM defenses and light area defenses could also present severe monitoring problems.

7. Even more important, in my judgment, would be the likely Soviet reaction to any US proposal made at this time to permit additional ABM defenses. Not only would they be opposed to such an initiative by the US, but it would likely call into question US motives and objectives with respect to arms control in general and the current SALT negotiations in particular.

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8. With respect to possible clarification of provisions on Treaty language, I would make the following observations:

a. Clarification of "along the periphery" [III A-1-C] is not required for monitoring purposes.

b. Clarification of limits on future ABM systems [III A-2-C] is also not required for monitoring purposes, and probably could not be defined precisely.

c. Distinctions among strategic ABM, ATBM, and SAM systems [III A-3-C] and the application of the ABM Treaty to ATBM systems as well as strategic ABM systems [III B-3-C] are interrelated questions and should be considered together.

-- Technological distinctions probably cannot be made among these systems. Therefore, we cannot assess the specific implications of limiting such systems for monitoring since our capabilities would be dependent on the technical distinctions being defined. Even with such distinctions, we anticipate that the monitoring task would be much more difficult.

-- Perhaps the best way to handle the future SAM and ATBM problem is on a case-by-case basis. As these new systems are developed, technical assessments of their capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles will be made by the Intelligence Community. Because Article VI of the Treaty prohibits giving non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles, Soviet development of new highly capable systems could, if necessary, be challenged in the Standing Consultative Commission on the basis of this Article.

[Redacted Signature]

STANSFIELD TURNER

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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May 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Acting Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Director of Central Intelligence

Attached herewith is a copy of the summary and notes of the  
May 4 SCC meeting on the Indian Ocean.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

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SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING

May 4, 1977

Time and Place: 9:30 a.m. - 10:20 a.m., WH Situation Room

Subject: PRM/NSC-25, Arms Control in the Indian Ocean

Participants:

State

Warren Christopher  
Leslie Gelb

ACDA

Paul Warnke  
John Newhouse

Defense

Charles W. Duncan  
Gen. George S. Brown, JCS  
Lt. Gen. William Smith, JCS  
Lynn E. Davis

NSC

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
William G. Hyland  
Gary Sick  
James Thomson

CIA

Adm. Stansfield Turner

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Three basic issues were discussed:

1. What are the US negotiating objectives in conducting talks with the USSR? All agreed that the concept of demilitarization needed to be spelled out more fully. JCS and CIA felt that the paper did not adequately identify the security risks involved, and they agreed to provide follow-on papers discussing this more fully. It was agreed that the Working Group would conduct a more systematic evaluation of the three options (demilitarization, limitation, freeze), including the political and military risks and benefits of each.

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2. What tactics should the United States adopt in the first meeting with the Soviets? It was agreed that the initial talks should be of an exploratory nature. State and Defense felt that this should be combined with the possible adoption of some confidence-building measures. ACDA felt that confidence-building measures were not particularly important in the Indian Ocean context and would prefer initial discussion of some general negotiating principles. It was agreed that all leaned toward the first option of initial exploratory talks, with some latitude, taking into account the implications of confidence-building measures as possibly legitimizing the Soviet presence in Somalia.

3. How will we organize our ongoing effort within the US bureaucracy? All agreed that a working group should be formed under the chairmanship of the Director of the Political-Military Bureau at State. This group would examine more fully the risks and benefits of each of the major negotiating objectives in preparation for a subsequent SCC meeting following talks with the Soviets in Moscow on June 8. The group should also consider the consultative process with US allies and other concerned nations.

The following issues were left unresolved:

- Should our negotiating objective be complete demilitarization?
- Should "demilitarization" be defined in some truncated fashion to permit some US deployments to the area?
- Should our objective be a freeze on deployments or some form of limitations short of demilitarization?

These will be considered further in the SCC after additional analysis in the Working Group and initial discussions with the USSR.

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